Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

5-15-1953

Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital
Dist. [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital Dist. [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 286.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/286

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

May 1953] TALLEY v. NoRTHERN SAN Dmoo HosP. DisT.

33

[41 C.2d 33; 257 P.2d 22]

contract, and hence required the presentment or filing of a
rJaim. In Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal.2d 713 [221 P.2d 9], the
complaint had countR on contract and tort involving the same
transaction. Plaintiff attached and it was held that he was
estopped to rely upon the action in tort. Similarly, here
plaintiff attached the bank account of Wellins indicating
reliance upon a contract debt rather than a claim to specific
property as the beneficiary of a constructive trust.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4,
1953.

[L. A. No. 22537.

In Bank.

May 15, 1953.]

NAOMI S. 'fALLEY et al., Appellants, v. NORTHERN SAN
DIEGO COUN'fY HOSPITAL DISTRICT (a Corporation) , Respondent.
[1] Pleading-Admissions.-For purpose of testing a question of
law, all facts well pleaded are admitted.
[2] !d.-Facts Judicially Noticed.-Facts of which judicial notice
may be taken will be considered by court, although not pleaded,
for purpose of testing a question of law.
[3] State of California-Actions Against.-When acting in its
governmental capacity a sovereign may not be sued, except
where the doctrine has been specifically departed from by constitutional or statutory law.
[4] !d.-Tort Liability.-Doctrine of sovereign nonliability for
tort applies to state subdivisions only where they are acting in
a governmental capacity in discharge of official duties.
[5] !d.-Tort Liability.-Where the state engages in industrial or
business enterprises, as distinguished from purely governmental
activities, tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated pursuant to the consent statute. (Gov. Code, § 16041.)
[3] See· Cal.Jur., State of California, § 37 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
States, Territories and Dependencies, § 91 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 138; [2] Pleading, § 13;
[3, 15] State of California, § 67; [4, 5] State of California, §57;
[6] Hospitals,§ 1; [7-10] Hospitals,§ 8; [11-14] Hospitals,§ 5.1.
41 C.2d-2
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Hospital~Character.-~Although county hospitals are administered by county boards of supervisors while hospitals operated by local hospital districts are administered by boards of
directors, both are governmental agencies.
[7] Id.-Tort Liability.-County hospitals exercise governmental
functions and counties are not liable for the negligence of employees toward patients therein.
[8] Id.-Tort Liability-What are Governmental Functions.-The
imposition of a charge for service by a hospital operated by a
local hospital district is not inconsistent with the exercise of a
governmental function.
[9] Id.-Tort Liability-Governmental or Proprietary Nature of
Acts.-The profit or nonprofit phase of the activity engaged in
by a hospital operated by a local hospital district is not determinative of either a proprietary or governmental function.
[10] Id.-Tort Liability-Governmental or Propriet.ary Nature of
Acts.-The test for determining the governmental or proprietary nature of acts of a hospital operated by a local hospital district is whether the particular activity in which such
governmental agency is engaged at the time of the injury is
of a public or a private nature.
[11] !d.-Hospital Districts-Purpose of Statute.-Primary purpose of Local Hospital District Law (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 32000 et seq.) is to fulfill function of protecting public health
and welfare by furnishing hospital services in areas where hospital facilities are inadequate.
[12] !d.-Hospital Districts-Promotion of Health and General
Welfare.-While the health and general welfare of the citizens
of a county may be promoted by the availability of a county
hospital regardless of the ability to pay, the health and general
welfare of the citizens of a district are likewise promoted by
the availability of such a hospital within the district.
[13] !d.-Hospital Districts-Validity of Statute.-In the exercise
of its police power the state may act to provide for the public
health and welfare, and this in essence is what the Local Hospital District Law was designed to accomplish.
[14] !d.-Hospital Districts-Right to Sue and be Sued.-Provision
of Health & Sa£. Code, § 32121, that a hospital district has
the power "to sue and be sued in all courts and places and in all
actions and proceedings whatever" merely means that the district is authorized to appear as a party to an action where it
otherwise would be entitled to prosecute such an. action or
otherwise be liable to answer in damages; it does not enlarge
the liability of the district.

[6]

[7] See Cal.Jur., Hospitals and Asylums, § 9; Am.Jur., Hospitals
and Asylums, § 12 et seq.
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[15] State of Californiar-Actions Against.-Whether the doctrine
of sovereign immunity to suit should be modified is a legislative
question.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. John A. Hewicker, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for injuries suffered by hospital patient.
Judgment for defendant on sustaining demurrer to amended
eomplaint without leave to amend, affirmed.
David S. Casey for Appellants.
Belli, Ashe & Pinney and Renetzky & Davis, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellants.
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye and Ward W. Waddell, Jr., for
Respondent.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the
defendant in an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from the negligence of the
defendant's agents in caring for the plaintiff while she was
a patient at the defendant's hospital. Judgment was entered
upon the sustaining of a demurrer on the ground that the
amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. The
court took judicial notice of the fact that the defendant is
a local hospital district, organized under section 32000 et seq.
of the Health and Safety Code, and applied the rule that
a hospital performing a governmental function is not liable
for personal injuries suffered ·oy patients as a result of the
negligence of its employees.
The amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff was admitted to the defendant's hospital for the purpose of delivering her of a child; that while she was in a state of unconsciousness brought about by the use of an anaesthetic the
defendant and its agents allowed her body and legs to become
burned by the negligent use of hot water bottles; that as
a result she suffered serious and permanent injuries; that
the defendant's hospital was "open to the public as a hospital
where a person, for a money consideration, could obtain
hospital and medical serviees"; that the plaintiff was accepted
as a patient ''for a money consideration . . . and became in-
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debted and was given a bill for services rendered'' by the
defendant.
[1] For the purpose of testing a question of law all facts
well pleaded are of course admitted. [2] Additional facts of
which judicial notice may be taken will also be considered
by the court although not pleaded. (French v. Senate of
Calif., 146 Cal. 604, 608 [80 P. 1031, 2 Ann.Cas. 756, 69
L.R.A. 556]; Mullan v. State, 114 Cal. 578, 581 [46 P. 670,
34 L.R.A. 262) .) The defendant hospital district was organized under the provisions of the Local Hospital District
Law (Stats. 1945, ch. 932, p. 1738; §§ 32000 et seq., Health
& Saf. Code). The question presented is whether that
statute has created an agency immune from liability in tort
for the negligence of its agents.
[3] It is generally recognized that when acting in its
govenmental capacity a sovereign may not be sued except
where the doctrine has been specifically departed from by
constitutional or statutory law. (People v. Superior Court,
29 Cal.2d 754, 756 [178 P.2d 1] .) The plaintiffs contend
that a statutory departure from the doctrine has been brought
about in this state.
In 1893 (Stats. 1893, p. 57) the Legislature enacted its
first general statute providing for suits against the state.
The rule is expressed today by section 16041 of the Government Code ( Stats. 1945, p. 511) as follows : "Any person
who has a claim against the State (1) on express contract,
(2) for negligence, or (3) for the taking or damaging of
private property for public use within the meaning of Section
14 of Article I of the Constitution, shall present the claim
to the board in accordance with Section 16021. If the claim
is rejected or disallowed by the board, the claimant may bring
an action against the State on the claim and prosecute it to
a final judgment, subject to the conditions prescribed by
this chapter.''
In Chapman v. State (1894), 104 Cal. 690 [38 P. 457,
43 Am.St.Rep. 158), recovery was sought for a loss alleged
to have been due to the negligence of the Harbor Commissioners in maintaining a wharf. The facts involved occurred
prior to the enactment of 1893. The court refused to apply
the act retroactively to create any liability against the state
for past negligence, leaving open the question of the prospective effect of tortious acts of officers of the state. The
court concluded, however, that a contractual liability existed
prior to the act of 1893 and allowed the plaintiff to recover
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his loss in the action as an additional remedy given by the
statute. The rule of the Chapman case with regard to tortious
actions was followed in Melvin v. State (1898), 121 Cal. 16
[53 P. 416], again involving facts prior to the enactment
of 1893. Denning v. State ( 1899), 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000],
directly presented the question of the state's prospective
tortious liability under the act. Without noting the problem
left open in prior cases, the court applied the language of
the Chapman and Melvin cases as holding that the act of
1893 ''did not create any liability or cause of action against
the state where none existed before, but merely gave an
additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been enacted."
In reviewing the foregoing line of decisions, this court in
People v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1],
stated: ''Thus there was adopted in this state the doctrine
that state consent to be sued for negligence did not waive
sovereign immunity from liability for tort.''
Prior to the enactment of 1893 the court was confronted
with a statute authorizing the commencement of actions
against the state for damages resulting from the construction
of a channel in the American River by a levee commission.
The court held (Green v. State (1887), 73 Cal 29 [11 P. 602,
14 P. 610]) that the statute did not waive any legal defense
except that of immunity from suit. Thus, where the state
was engaged in a public work for the common good, that is,
in a governmental activity as distinguished from a commercial enterprise, the former constituted a defense to the action
authorized by the statute.
In Melvin v. State, supra, 121 Cal. 16 [53 P. 416], in denying the retroactive application of the act of 1893, the court
pointed out that the state was engaged in a governmental
activity. In Denning v. State, supra, 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000],
in denying the prospective application of the act the court
noted that the plaintiff was employed by the state in a
governmental activity at the time of his injury. [4] Following these decisions it was generally held that the doctrine
of sovereign nonliability for tort applied to state subdivisions
but only where they were acting in a governmental capacity
in the discharge of official duties. (People v. Superior Court,
supra, 29 Cal.2d 754, 760 [178 P.2d 1]; Nissen v. Cordua
Irr. Dist., 204 Cal. 542 [269 P. 171]; Kellar v. City of Los
Angeles, 179 Cal. 605 [178 P. 505] ; Davoust v. City of Alameda, 149 Cal. 69, 70 [84 P. 760, 9 Ann.Cas. 847, 5 L.R.A.N.S.
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536] ; Madison v. City & County of Ban F'ranC?:sco, 106 Cal.
App.2d 232 [234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d 141] .) [5] On the other
hand, "where the state engaged in industrial or business
enterprises, as distinguished from purely governmental activities, tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated pursuant to the consent statute.'' (People v. Superior Court,
supra, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1]; see, also, Yolo v. Modesto
Irr. Dist., 216 Cal. 274 [13 P.2d 908] .)
The defendant hospital district is a public corporation
(Health & Sa£. Code, § 32001), duly formed as the result
of the favorable vote of a majority of the voters in the
district (Health & Saf. Code, § 32003). Although no section of the statute specifically declares the purpose for which
the district is created that purpose is made apparent from
the statute as a whole. Thus, in section 32125 (powers of a
local hospital district) it is declared that: "The board of
directors shall be responsible for the operation of all hospitals owned or leased by the district, according to the best
interests of the public health. . . . . '' In section 32128
(Minimum standards of a local hospital district) it is stated
that ''The rules of the hospital, established by the board of
directors pursuant to this article, shall include. . . . 5. Such
limitations with respect to the practice of medicine and surgery in the hospital as the board of directors may find to be
in the best interests of the public health and welfare. . . . ''
Section 32129 prohibits the district from rendering any
professional services, either directly or through persons employed by the hospital. Professional services may be rendered
by physicians and surgeons who contract to do so with the
district, but only on a basis which does not result in any
profit or gain to the district. Section 32125 provides that
''In fixing the rates the board shall, insofar as possible
establish such rates as will permit the hospital to be operated
upon a self-supporting basis." Section 32200 gives the district the right to finance itself by taxation of "real and
personal property within the district,'' and sections 32201
et seq. provide means by which an annual tax may be levied
and collected to support the operations of the district during
the next ensuing fiscal year.
It is the contention of the defendant district that it is
exercising a governmental function under the laws of the
state; that it is not acting in a proprietary capacity, and
that as a result it is immune from a suit for personal injuries.
It is insisted that the same rule should apply to hospitals
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organized under the provisions of the Local Hospital District
Law as apply to county hospitals organized and operated
under section 200 et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions ()ode.
(6] The principal difference between the two appears to be
that county hospitals are administered by county boards of
supervisors while hospitals operated by local hospital districts are administered by a board of directors. But both
are governmental agencies. County hospitals may charge
patients for hospitalization and medical care (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 203.5) ; are supported by taxation (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 200); and tend to promote the public health and
welfare (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203). [7] The cases have
uniformly held that county hospitals are exercising governmental functions and that the counties are not liable for the
negligence of employees towards patients therein. (Sherbonrne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113 [81 Am.Dec. 151]; Madison v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 106 Cal.App.2d
232 [234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d 141] ; Latham v. Santa Clara
Cottnty Hospital, 104 Cal.App.2d 336 [231 P.2d 513]; Griffin v.
County of Colusa, 44 Cal.App.2d 915 [113 P.2d 270]; Calkins
v. Newton, 36 Cal.App.2d 262 [97 P.2d 523].)
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish the present case from
those dealing with county hospitals on the ground that the
authority of county hospitals to charge fees is limited to
those patients otherwise eligible for admission because of
financial circumstances or the unavailability of other hospital
facilities (Latham v. Santa Clara County Hospital, supra,
104 Cal.App.2d 336 [231 P.2d 513]) ; whereas there is no
limitation on the admission of paying patients to hospitals
operated by local hospital districts (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 32125). [8] However, any distinction based upon the right
to charge for hospitalization or medical care is not apparent.
The imposition of a charge for service is not inconsistent
with the exercise of a governmental function. (Kellar v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, 179 Cal. 605 [178 P. 505] ;
Latha1n v. Santa Clara County Hospital, supra, 104 Cal.
App.2d 336 [231 P.2d 513]; Calkins v. Newton, S1tpra, 36
Cal.App.2d 262,267 [97 P.2d 523].) [9] Neither is the profit
or nonprofit phase of the activity engaged in determinative
of either a proprietary or a governmental function. (People
v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.2d 754 [178 P.2d 1]; cf.
Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478 [163 P. 670,
Ann.Cas. 1918D 106, L.R.A. 1917E 685].) [10] The test is
whether the particular activity in which the governmental
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agency is engaged at the time of the injury is of a public
or a private nature. The agency may be authorized to act
in both capacities. For example, it has been held that an
irrigation district, so long as it operates only as an irrigation
district, is acting in a governmental capacity within the
meaning of the rule that such agencies are not liable for tort.
(Nissen v. Cordua Irrigation Distn:ct, supra, 204 Cal. 542
[269 P. 171]; Whiteman v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irr. Dist.,
60 Cal.App. 234 [212 P. 706].) But when it steps aside and
engages in the business of selling power in a proprietary
capacity it is liable in tort. (Yolo v. Modesto Irr. Dist., supra,
216 Cal. 274 [13 P.2d 908]; see, also, Davoust v. City of
Alameda, supra, 149 Cal. 69 [84 P. 760, 9 Ann.Cas. 847, 5
L.R.A.N.S. 536] .)
[11] In the present case the statute does not authorize
the hospital district to engage in private business. The primary purpose of the statute is to fulfill the function of
protecting the public health and welfare by furnishing hospital services in areas where hospital facilities are for some
reason inadequate, especially in those rural districts where
hospitals cannot be maintained without extraordinary governmental support. [12] While the health and general welfare of
the citizens of a county may be promoted by the availability
of a county hospital regardless of the ability to pay (Calkins
v. Newton, supra, 36 Cal.App.2d 262, 266 [97 P.2d 523] ),
it is equally true that the health and general welfare of the
citizens of a district are promoted by the availability of such
a hospital within the district. [13] In the exercise of its
police power the state may act to provide for the public
health and welfare and this in essence is what the Local
Hospital District Law was designed to accomplish.
The plaintiff relies upon Silva v. Providence Hospital of
Oakland, 14 Cal.2d 762 [97 P.2d 798]. The court held that
the private charitable hospital there involved was not immune
from liability in tort for negligent acts of its agents. That
case has no application where as here the immunity arises
out of the governmental nature of the activity engaged in by
a public agency.
·
[14] It is contended that the present action is specifically
authorized by section 32121 of the Health and Safety Code,
which provides that ''Each hospital district shall have and
exercise the following powers . . . (b) To sue and be sued
in all courts and places and in all actions and proceedings
whatever. . . . '' This provision of the statute means no more
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than that the district is authorized to appear as a party to
an action where it otherwise would be entitled to prosecute
such an action or otherwise be liable to answer in damages.
in Nissen v. Cordua Irr. Dist., supra, 204 Cal. 542 [269
P. 171], it was held that a provision in the California Irrigation District Act authorizing the board of an irrigation
district "to sue, appear and defend" in all courts, actions,
suits, or proceedings did not enlarge the liability of the district and applied only to actions such as a public corporation
might otherwise be subjected to.
[15] Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should
be modified in this state is a legislative question. New York's
consent statute prior to 1939 was construed by its courts
not to create a cause of action in favor of a claimant which
did not theretofore exist, although the state's immunity to
suit was waived. (Smith v. State of New York, 227 N.Y. 405
[125 N.E. 841, 13 A.L.R. 1264] .) The rule applied in New
York was similar to that announced by this court in its early
beginnings and since consistently adhered to. To impose a
liability upon the state for the tortious acts of its agents
committed in the performance of a governmental function,
the New York Legislature adopted its Court of Claims Act
in 1939 by which the state waived both its immunity from
suit and its defense of performing of governmental function.
The act expressly provides that the state's liability be determined in accordance with the same rules of law as are applied
in actions against individuals or private corporations. No such
legislative change in the law of this state has been made.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Again it is necessary for me to protest the continuance of
the archaic, outmoded, unfair and discriminatory doctrine of
governmental immunity blindly followed by the majority in
this case. As I have heretofore pointed out, and as I will continue to point out, the reason which ever existed for the rule
has long since ceased to exist, and when the reason ceases, so
should the rule (Civ. Code, § 3510).
Section 32121 of the Health and Safety Code specifically
provides that ''Each hospital district shall have and exercise
the following powers: . . . ; (b) To sue and b~ sued in all
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courts and places and in all actions and proceedings whatever. . . . '' (Emphasis added.) A majority of this court holds
that ''This provision of the statute means no more than that
the district is authorized to appear as a party to an action
where it otherwise would be entitled to prosecute such an
action or otherwise be liable to answer in damages.'' This
statement m.ay have a meaning known only to the majority,
but it is held to have no meaning here where the facts show
that plaintiff, a paying patient, in a hospital run by a local
hospital district, was badly burned while unconscious, as the
result of the gross negligence of the employees of the hospital.
Such a holding is a travesty on justice and should lead every
ill person to travel as many miles as his, or her, condition permits to find haven in a hospital which will be liable for its
tortious conduct. 'l'o say that the state was engaged in a
public work for the common good-that is, in a governmental
activity as distinguished from a commercial enterprise-is begging the question. Under that definition, a minister would not
be liable for tortious conduct; a doctor could never be sued
for malpractice; a private hospital located conveniently near
any ill patient would never be liable for injury flowing from
its negligence; a dentist would not be liable for tortious conduct toward his patients. All of these tend to promote the
public welfare and the public health. The fact that all of
them engage in their various professions for personal monetary gain, no matter how slight, is not of the least importance
under the rule stated in the majority opinion where we are
told that "Neither is the profit or nonprofit phase of the
activity engaged in determinative of either a proprietary or
a governmental function'' and that ''The imposition of a
charge for service is not inconsistent with the exercise of a
governmental function.'' We are told that the test ''is whether
the particular activity in which the governmental agency is
engaged at the time of the injury is of a public or a private
nature.''
Such a hospital as the one here concerned is in direct
competition with private enterprises of the same character.
No thinking person could seriously contend, as I have just
done, that a private hospital, a doctor, a dentist, or even a
minister; should not be liable for its, or his, or her, torts, and
yet the majority is so anxious to absolve any governmental
agency from liability for its torts, that that is the logical outcome of this perpetuation of an outmoded and archaic theory.
This is obvious because the only peg on which the entire
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opinion rests is that in organizing such a hospital the state
has promoted the health and general welfare of citizens in the
particular community. When a patient enters such a hospital
as a private patient, under the care of his, or her, own doctor,
he or she should not be classified with an indigent person receiving care and aid from the welfare fund of the state if this
absurd rule of governmental immunity is to go on ad nauseum.
The government obviously cannot insure the citizen against
all defects and errors in administration, but there is no reason
why the most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully sustained by
the citizen, those arising from the torts of governmental officers
and employees, should be allowed to rest at the door of the
unfortunate citizen alone. The entire doctrine of governmental
immunity rests upon a rotten foundation, and professors,
writers and liberal-minded judges are of the view that it
should be placed in the judicial garbage can where it belongs.
(See Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85 [136 P.2d 480] ;
75 A.L.R. 1196; Brooklyn Law Review, April, 1932, "Should
the Liability of Municipalities in Tort be Extended to Include
Injury and Damage Caused in the Negligent Performance of a
Governmental Function?"; 120 A.L.R. 1376; 54 Harv.L.
Rev., pp: 437-462, "Mttnicipal Tort Liability in Operation.")
The majority opinion, in order to achieve its unjust result,
finds it necessary to go back to 1893, and to cite cases decided in that era. For example, Chapman v. State, 104 Cal.
690 [38 P. 457, 43 Am.St.Rep. 158], was decided in 1894;
Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16 [53 P. 416], was decided in 1898;
Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316 [55 P. 1000], was decided in
1899; Green v. State, 73 Cal. 29 [11 P. 602, 14 P. 610], was
decided in 1887; Sherbourne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113 [81
Am.Dec. 151], was decided in 1862. Apparently it is easier
and more convenient to adhere to the views held by our early
predecessors on this court than it is to discard them, old,
outmoded and outworn as they are, for a doctrine or theory in
keeping with modern times. So far as a majority of this
court is concerned, we are living even farther back than the
horse and buggy days.
I had thought when People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d
754 [178 P.2d 1], was decided in 1947, that we had begun to
revamp our ideas. It was said there that "The considerations
of an asserted subversion of public interests by embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which developed the doctrine of
nonliability of the sovereign in former times, are no longer
persuasive in relation to an industrial or business enterprise
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which by itself may be looked to for the discharge of all
appropriate demands and expenses growing out of operation.''
I find, however, that this court has again reverted to the old,
archaic theory of sovereign immunity and will continue to
hold that a governmental agency, no matter how it conducts
its business, is engaged in its governmental capacity and is,
therefore, immune from tort liability. I dissented from the
denial of a hearing in illadison v. City & County of San Francisco, 106 Cal.App.2d 232 [234 P.2d 995, 236 P.2d 141], a case
involving governmental immunity, and I will do so every
time a majority of this court votes to perpetuate the archaic
and outmoded doctrine.
\¥e are told in the majority opinon, that whether the doctrine should be modified in this state is a legislative question.
Under the section of the Health and Safety Code heretofore
quoted, it is no longer a legislative question. The Legislature
has already spoken. It has provided that such a district may
''sue and be sued in all courts and places and in all actions
and proceedings whatever." It is difficult to imagine language
which could set forth with more clarity the position already
taken by the Legislature, and if the majority of this court
was not so fettered and weighted down by the outmoded
traditional concept of sovereign immunity it would so hold in
this case.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial
court to overrule the demurrer and permit the defendant to
answer if it be so advised.

